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ALL OF THIS HAS HAPPENED BEFORE
AND ALL OF THIS WILL HAPPEN AGAIN:1
INNOVATION IN COPYRIGHT LICENSING
Rebecca Tushnet †

ABSTRACT
Claims that copyright licensing can substitute for fair use have a long history. This
Article focuses on a new cycle of the copyright licensing debate, which has brought revised
arguments in favor of universal copyright licensing. First, the new arrangements offered by
large copyright owners often purport to sanction the large-scale creation of derivative works,
rather than mere reproductions, which were the focus of earlier blanket licensing efforts.
Second, the new licenses are often free. Rather than demanding royalties as in the past,
copyright owners just want a piece of the action—along with the right to claim that
unlicensed uses are infringing. In a world where licenses are readily and cheaply available, the
argument will go, it is unfair not to get one. This development, copyright owners hope, will
combat increasingly fair use–favorable case law.
This Article describes three key examples of recent innovations in licensing-like
arrangements in the noncommercial or formerly noncommercial spheres—Getty Images’
new free embedding of millions of its photos, YouTube’s Content ID, and Amazon’s Kindle
Worlds—and discusses how uses of works under these arrangements differ from their
unlicensed alternatives in ways both subtle and profound. These differences change the
nature of the communications and communities at issue, illustrating why licensing can never
substitute for transformative fair use even when licenses are routinely available. Ultimately,
as courts have already recognized, the mere desire of copyright owners to extract value from
a market—especially when they desire to extract it from third parties rather than licensees—
should not affect the scope of fair use.

1. See Battlestar Galactica (NBC Universal Television 2004–2007; Universal Media
Studios 2007–2009).
© 2014 Rebecca Tushnet.
† Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Thanks to Julie Cohen for helpful
comments.
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I.

INTRODUCTION: REBOOTING LICENSING?

Claims that copyright licensing can substitute for fair use are nothing
new. Among other iterations, they’ve been made on behalf of the dream of a
“celestial jukebox” that would charge audiences anew for each enjoyment of
a copyrighted work,2 and on behalf of large publishers hoping to be paid for
each photocopy of a journal or newspaper article.3 This Article focuses on a
new cycle of the copyright-licensing debate, which has brought revised
arguments in favor of universal copyright licensing. First, the new
arrangements offered by large copyright owners often purport to sanction (or
is it tolerate?4) the large-scale creation of derivative works, rather than mere
reproductions, which were the focus of earlier blanket licensing efforts.
Second, the new licenses are often free, and may even offer opportunities for
2. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (rev. ed. 2003).
3. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
4. See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use (Columbia Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper Grp.,
Paper No. 333, 2008).
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licensees to profit. Rather than demanding royalties as in the past, copyright
owners just want a piece of the action—along with the right to claim that
unlicensed uses are infringing. In a world where licenses are readily and
cheaply available, the argument will go, it is unfair not to get one.5
These new attempts to expand licensing in ways that take into account
the new digital economy and the rise of “user-generated content” face a fair
use doctrine that is in some ways less favorable to copyright owners than it
was several decades ago, when a few key decisions supported the rise of
(allegedly) blanket reproduction licenses.6 Even then it was plain that
copyright owners’ desire to license had the potential to make the “effect on
the market” factor of fair use analysis weigh inevitably in favor of a plaintiff
because a copyright owner operating a licensing scheme could simply assert
that it would have received a licensing fee had the defendant not made its
unauthorized use. Courts ruling in copyright owners’ favor stated that the
presence of a licensing scheme wasn’t dispositive, but then proceeded as if it
was.7
Subsequently, courts developed a few tools to limit the circularity of the
licensing argument. Many cases say that a foregone license fee should only be
considered in “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed” markets.8
Another way of explaining the limit looks to the underlying justification for
fair use: that some uses of copyrighted works shouldn’t be under the
copyright owner’s control, because sometimes freedom serves copyright’s
5. Other countries currently without fair use are facing the same questions. See
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, ALRC REPORT 122, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY 50 (2014) (“A key issue in this Inquiry is whether unremunerated use exceptions
should apply ‘if there is a licensing solution’ applicable to the user. On one view, ‘in
principle, no exception should allow a use that a user can make under a licensing solution
available to them.’ ”) (citing submission by Copyright Agency/Viscopy).
6. A few key decisions supported a broad preference for licensing over fair use in
photocopying and coursepacks. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs.,
Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d
913 (2d Cir. 1994); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
7. See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 913; Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1401
(Martin, C.J., dissenting).
8. E.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013); Bill Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Am.
Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257,
1282 (11th Cir. 2001); Núñez v. Caribbean Intern. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir.
2000); American Institute of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A., Civil No.
12-528 (RHK/JJK), 2013 WL 4666330, at *13 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 2013); Kane v. Comedy
Partners, No. 00 Civ. 158(GBD), 2003 WL 22383387, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003),
aff’d, 98 F. App’x 73 (2d Cir. 2004).
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goals of encouraging creation and dissemination of expression better than
centralized control. Recent decisions have explicitly held that, even if
copyright owners would like to license “transformative” uses—uses that
provide new meanings and messages—of their works, these uses aren’t
within the scope of their rights, and failure to receive a license fee for
transformative uses therefore can’t be counted as a harm.9
While copyright owners have lost some significant cases in court, they are
trying to change the facts on the ground to achieve many of the same
benefits that they could get from a legally established right to license
transformative uses.10 Once again, copyright owners are claiming that
licensing is always the answer, and that every use of an expressive work
should involve a commercial transaction. For example, the Harry Fox
Agency, a musical-work licensing organization, claims that “licensing is just
the first step in a process intended to result in accurate payment by users to
songwriters and music publishers for each and every use of their songs.”11 To
these rights-owners, fair use is expropriation: “[L]egalizing the unauthorized
use of preexisting material triggers a form of class warfare between
appropriation artists and original artists. Instead, public policy should
incentivize and promote collaboration between appropriation and original
artists, including the voluntary licensing requirement that is at the core of the
free marketplace collaborative relationship.”12
9. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 12-4547-cv, 2014 WL 2576342, at
*9–10 (2d Cir. June 10, 2014); SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273 (9th
Cir. 2013); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir.
2006); Nat’l Ctr. for Jewish Film v. Riverside Films LLC, No. 5:12-cv-00044-ODW(DTBx),
2012 WL 4052111 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012); Warren Publ’g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp.
2d 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
10. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 899–903 (2007) (discussing effect of licensing on development of copyright
law).
11. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, POST-MEETING COMMENTS OF THE
HARRY FOX AGENCY, INC. 4 (Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
the_harry_fox_agency_inc._post-meeting_comments.pdf (emphasis added); see also NAT’L
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.
GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY, WRITTEN COMMENTS OF COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER, INC. 7 (Nov. 13,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/copyright_clearance_center_
comments.pdf (advocating for a pay-per-use system and arguing that “if you do get rights
right, the market then changes,” meaning that licensing should take over).
12. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, REPLY COMMENTS OF ASCAP ET AL. 3
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This Article describes three key examples of recent innovations in
licensing-like arrangements in the noncommercial or formerly
noncommercial spheres—Getty Images’ new free embedding of millions of
its photos, YouTube’s Content ID, and Amazon’s Kindle Worlds—and
discusses how uses of works under these arrangements differ from their
unlicensed alternatives in ways both subtle and profound. These differences
change the nature of the communications and communities at issue,
illustrating why licensing can never substitute for transformative fair use even
when licenses are routinely available.
The innovations I will examine attempt to get Internet users accustomed
to light, rarely visible supervision by copyright owners of uses that are
individually low-value but may be valuable in the aggregate in the form of
direct income or of monetizable data on consumer behavior. While there’s
room in the copyright ecosystem for these innovations, it would be a grave
mistake to conclude that the problem of licensing has finally been cracked
and that fair use can now, at last, retreat to a vestigial doctrine. Ultimately, as
courts have already recognized, the mere desire of copyright owners to
extract value from a market—especially when they desire to extract it from
third parties rather than licensees—should not affect the scope of fair use.13
This conclusion is even more appropriate where, as here, these schemes
don’t actually require monetary payment from users, the way previous
generations of true licensing did. These aren’t ordinary buyer/seller markets,
and they won’t be. Because this principle is already present in copyright law, I
hope it will prove easier to defend than it has been to fend off some other
expansive copyright claims.14 But the argument will regularly need to be
reasserted, because no matter what the law says, some copyright owners will
perennially seek to replace fair use with a right to collect for every exposure
to their works.

(2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/ascap_bmi_cmpa_nsai_nmpa_riaa_
sesac_post-meeting_comments.pdf (footnote omitted); see also id. at 3 (“As a practical matter,
the digital licensing ecosystem in place today is much better than in the past and will only
continue to improve going forward. The contractual deal points in digital sample licenses
have become standardized and are relatively easy to negotiate.”) (footnote omitted).
13. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (approving copyright term
extension); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (approving copyright restoration of
foreign works previously in the public domain).
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THERE ARE MANY COPIES, AND THEY HAVE A PLAN:
THREE EXPERIMENTS IN LICENSING OR NEARLICENSING

This Part offers a detailed look at three examples of large-scale attempts
to control and monetize, rather than suppress, previously unauthorized
online uses. As I will argue, these attempts are not replacements for fair use,
because the project of monetization and control requires significant changes
in practice. My examples work across different genres—photography for
Getty Images; music and video for YouTube’s Content ID; and books and
videogames for Amazon’s Kindle Worlds. Regardless of the genre, the
aspirations of copyright holders are the same. They aim not just to put the
genie of frictionless copying back into the bottle, but also to make it start
granting their wishes.
As a result, certain themes will recur throughout this discussion: the
systems’ abilities to suppress uses deemed unacceptable by copyright owners;
their expansive and potentially invasive data collection; and their
concentrating effect on markets for expressive works. The first theme—the
suppression of unpopular uses—is routinely a stated concern of fair use
doctrine. The fact that a copyright owner may try to prevent uses it
disapproves of on noneconomic grounds is an important reason to have fair
use protections.15 But while the second and third themes, erosion of privacy
and effects on market competition, are not explicitly part of most copyright
analyses,16 I will suggest that they too help explain why pervasive licensing
should not limit fair use, and why the presence of such licensing even
increases the need for a broad fair use doctrine. Pervasive control and
surveillance shape what people create and imagine themselves creating, and a
dominant intermediary can harm individual creators. Thus, even someone
only concerned with authors should consider privacy and competition
relevant to copyright policy.
Each of these themes deserves careful consideration, especially when
pervasive licensing is presented as a substitute for fair use. The themes are
tightly intertwined: control via large-scale licensing invites the exercise of
power to keep certain viewpoints and uses off-limits; it enables and generates
15. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
16. Software copyright cases do regularly consider competition issues, because software
is so often functional, but otherwise the concept rarely arises. As for users’ privacy, it is more
often a looming concern that is not explicitly considered. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling
Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2591 (2009) (explaining how fair use can support
privacy).
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returns from extensive data mining; and it assists with controlling whole
market structures in addition to individual works. Proponents of pervasive
licensing (or near-licensing) describe it as a way to embrace online cultures
while generating a profit, instead of attempting in vain to suppress all
unauthorized uses. But as one commentator on Kindle Worlds noted,
“[e]mbrace is always enclosure! The industry’s arms are made of fences!”17
Once individual participants are penned in, they can be counted, marked,
moved around, and cut out of the herd (to be shorn, or even to be
slaughtered if they’re more trouble than they’re worth).
A.

GETTY IMAGES: PICTURE-PERFECT CONTROL

Getty Images is the youngest of the three regimes I will discuss, and its
contours are thus less developed. However, its aspirations are as great—to
control, monitor, and monetize ordinary online image uses. Getty recently
made thirty-five million images available for automatic, payment-free use.18
Uses must be “noncommercial,” which Getty defines to include standard
reporting such as that found in the New York Times. Getty seems to mean
something like “noncommercial according to the First Amendment,” which
means that the uses must not propose a commercial transaction.19 Users
must embed the images using Getty’s proprietary code, which means that
they are not actually copying the image—they are simply linking to an image
hosted by Getty itself.
To lump this initiative in with “licensing” is to give Getty much more
than may first appear. In the United States, linking to an image hosted
elsewhere does not constitute a direct exercise of any exclusive right

17. Mel Stanfill, Kindle Worlds, Part 1: The Economic Raw Deal, MELSTANFILL.COM (May
27, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.melstanfill.com/kindle-worlds-part-1-the-economic-rawdeal/.
18. Olivier Laurent, Getty Images Makes 35 Million Images Free in Fight Against Copyright
Infringement, BRITISH JOURNAL OF PHOTOGRAPHY (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.bjponline.com/2014/03/getty-images-makes-35-million-images-free-in-fight-against-copyrightinfringement/ [hereinafter 35 Million Images].
19. See id. (explaining that Getty considers ad-supported blogs and editorial websites,
including the New York Times and Buzzfeed, to be noncommercial; a license is only required
“if they used our imagery to promote a service, a product or their business”); cf. Olivier
Laurent, 10 Facts You Need to Know About Getty Images’ Embed Feature, BRITISH JOURNAL OF
PHOTOGRAPHY (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.bjp-online.com/2014/03/10-facts-you-need-toknow-about-getty-images-embed-feature/ [hereinafter 10 Facts] (“However . . . the image
library doesn’t believe these news websites will want to feature an embed player with Getty
Images’ branding in their design, especially since the player cannot be resized. Plus, later on,
Getty Images will feature ads in its player, which would compete with news organisations’
own advertising models.”).
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protected by copyright.20 This remains true even if the hypertext markup
language employed to embed the image makes the image appear to a user as
if it was a seamless part of the linker’s webpage.21 Even in Europe, with its
far more restrictive rules, unauthorized linking to an image lawfully present
on a website doesn’t infringe the copyright owner’s rights.22 If the image is
itself infringing, there might be secondary liability under U.S. law for linking
to it in certain circumstances; but if a site hosts the image with the
permission of the copyright owner, there can be no liability, since there’s no
primary infringement. As a result, what Getty is doing isn’t “licensing” any
copyright rights at all. Getty is using various technological measures to make
it difficult to embed images without using Getty’s proprietary code,23 and so
users are getting something out of the deal, but they are not getting a
copyright license. However, Getty presents its move as a way of recognizing
the inevitability of the circulation of images online while moving today’s
countless unauthorized, purportedly infringing speakers into the space of
copyright licensing.24
1. Technical Tethering
Getty’s control over embedded images is near total—it limits potential
uses in many ways that fair use does not. While its consumer-facing website
promises that “[o]ur new embed feature makes it easy, legal, and free for
anybody to share our images on websites, blogs, and social media platforms,”
Getty in fact reserves the right to demand that any particular use stop at any
time.25 According to Getty’s terms, Getty embeds may only be used in
relation to “events that are newsworthy or of public interest,” and they may
20. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9th Cir.
2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
21. See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1161.
22. See Case C-466/12, Nils Svensson v. Retriever Sverige (Feb. 13, 2014), available at
http://curia.europa.eu (choose desired language, then search for case number C-466/12).
23. Circumventing those technological measures might implicate the quasi-copyright
rights conferred by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) § 103(a), 17 U.S.C. §
1201 (2012).
24. Joshua Brustein, Since It Can’t Sue Us All, Getty Images Embraces Embedded Photos,
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-06/sinceit-cant-sue-us-all-getty-images-embraces-embedded-photos/ (“Anyone can now visit
[Getty’s] website, grab some embed code, and display an image on blogs and social media
pages without paying a licensing fee. . . . The problem of purloined images is too big to solve
on a lawsuit-by-lawsuit basis. . . . People are inevitably going to display images publicly on
blogs and social media feeds, so the only way to remain relevant is to provide them with a
viable legal alternative.”).
25. Embed Images, GETTY IMAGES, http://www.gettyimages.com/Creative/Frontdoor/
embed/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (emphasis added).
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not be used “in a defamatory, pornographic or otherwise unlawful manner,”
limitations governed by Getty’s own interpretations.26
This control is more than contractual—it is artistic. A Getty embedded
image cannot be resized, edited, or cropped for editorial purposes;27 it may be
removed or changed at any time, leaving holes in a user’s work; and Getty
may run ads over it. All of these limits make a Getty embed a very different
artifact, expressively speaking, from an image that is not tethered
technologically. A Getty embed can’t be Photoshopped; it can’t be turned
into a meme;28 it can’t, in other words, be put into circulation in terms of
meaning. It can be seen, but not shared. It therefore lacks many of the
distinctive features of digital remix culture. The multiple variations that
evolve on sites like Tumblr and Know Your Meme depend on freedom to
edit, crop, and alter. This flexibility is an underappreciated aspect of current
infrastructure, but one that Getty embeds make more salient. Getty’s control
suppresses the mutability of images that is important to the creation and
transmission of meaning online.29

26. Terms of Use, GETTY IMAGES, http://www.gettyimages.com/Corporate/Terms.aspx
(last updated Mar. 2014).
27. Laurent, 10 Facts, supra note 19 (“The embed player has a width of 594 pixels and a
height of 465 pixels. It cannot be resized. It includes the image, without a watermark, with
the name of the photographer and the collection, plus Getty Images’ logo. This information
cannot be removed.”). As a result, a Getty embed does not show up as a thumbnail image in
various contexts, such as when a post using a Getty embed is shared on Facebook.
28. See generally LIMOR SHIFMAN, MEMES IN DIGITAL CULTURE (2013) (discussing
memes as transmissible and, crucially, reconfigurable units of culture); Ronak Patel, First World
Problems: A Fair Use Analysis of Internet Memes, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235 (2013) (arguing that
memes are fair use).
29. See Patel, supra note 28, at 252:
[Image-based memes] advance culture. They are a system of explaining
events by reducing them to a simple and well-known joke. Their fast
dissemination, imitation, and mutation causes them to become cultural
phenomena that are recognizable not because of the underlying works,
but because of the meme itself. This is significant because, while a single
meme in and of itself cannot cause cultural advancement, it is not the
meme itself that is important, but the fact that memes provide more
avenues of expression, thus increasing the chance that a message can be
transmitted to someone in an effective way. In other words, when society
and intellectual property laws allow memes to develop, the arsenal of
means of expression to the average Internet originator—and to those
referring to memes in regular conversation in order to elucidate their
argument—expands.
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2. Effortless Data Gathering
One digital innovation is central to a Getty embed: pervasive automated
monitoring. Consistent with the expansionist dreams of Big Data, Getty will
collect information on how each image is used and who is using and viewing
it. Getty intends “to utilise that data to the benefit of our business.”30
Although Getty hasn’t figured out an advertising model, that just makes
Getty more determined to make the program pay somehow, perhaps by
using the data to determine what types of images Getty photographers
should be creating in the future.31 It’s this very uncertainty about how
monetization might ultimately be accomplished that makes control of all the
data seem so valuable. While the shift to centralization seems to require little
in return from users (for example, screen real estate that allows Getty to run
ads), this move towards tracking every interaction fits well into what Julie
Cohen calls the “surveillance-innovation complex”:32 apparent crowdfriendliness in rhetoric conceals and legitimates architectures of control,
diminishing privacy in the name of technological innovation and convenient
(but not free) speech. As Cohen presciently noted, tighter copyright controls
of this sort presume, and require, the elimination of readers’ and viewers’
privacy.33 Getty will be able to track not only the people using its embeds, but
also the readers of those people’s posts, whose computers will be
communicating directly with Getty’s.
3. Market Control
In a final theme that will be echoed in the remaining examples, Getty
would like to control the platform, with all that potentially lucrative data. It is
interested in “shar[ing]” its embed feature with other content creators,
30. Laurent, 35 Million Images, supra note 18 (quoting Craig Peters, senior vice president
of business development, content, and marketing at Getty Images).
31. Id. (“The stock agency will also use the data it will draw from the player to perfect
its collections. ‘We’ll be working with the creative and editorial teams at Getty Images to
better understand how our imagery is being used and how they can better create imagery’
[says a Getty representative].”). Getty’s terms of service provide that it may share all the
information it collects with third parties, without limitation. Terms of Use, supra note 26
(“Getty Images (or third parties acting on its behalf) may collect data related to use of the
Embedded Viewer and embedded Getty Images Content . . . .”).
32. See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation Complex, BALKINIZATION (Mar.
11, 2014, 11:03 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/the-surveillance-innovationcomplex.html.
33. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE,
AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 155–86 (2012) (discussing the relationship
between copyright enforcement and architectures of control and surveillance online); Julie E.
Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003).
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presumably by licensing it to other image copyright owners for a cut of the
proceeds.34 Operating in a highly fragmented market, such a licensing scheme
will only benefit certain participants.35 Moreover, Getty photographers are
not allowed to opt out of the program, in the service of constructing the
largest possible database.36 It may not be surprising, therefore, that various
photography organizations reacted with some disquiet to the new program,
seeing it as a measure that might benefit Getty, but would not put money in
the pockets of individual photographers.37
B.

GOOGLE’S CONTENT ID: LICENSING THIRD PARTIES, NOT
CREATORS

Google’s Content ID for YouTube is a massive undertaking in which
copyright owners register works of video and audio with YouTube, and
Google scans uploaded video for video and audio matches. When a match
(including a partial match, where only some of the upload contains video or
audio in the Content ID database) is found, a copyright owner can choose to
run ads on the uploaded video without the permission of the uploader.38
34. Laurent, 35 Million Images, supra note 18.
35. See NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF
DEVIANTART 28 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
deviant_art_comments.pdf [hereinafter DEVIANTART NTIA COMMENTS] (“There are very
few licensing agents even for top line commercial artists such as professional photographers
and graphic artist[s] working at the peak of their profession. The assumption that the work
of these artists flows to corporate owners who can act as surrogates is false. Most works in
the visual arts are not works made for hire. Licensing of these works remains non-uniform.”)
(footnotes omitted).
36. Laurent, 35 Million Images, supra note 18.
37. Olivier Laurent, Industry Concerned About Getty Images’ Free-for-All Approach, BRITISH
JOURNAL OF PHOTOGRAPHY (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.bjp-online.com/2014/03/
industry-concerned-about-getty-images-free-for-all-approach/.
38. In Google’s words:
Rightsholders deliver to YouTube reference files (these can be audio-only
or video) of content they own, metadata describing that content, and
policies describing what they want YouTube to do when it finds a match.
Rightsholders can choose between three policies when an upload matches
their content: 1) make money from them (for monetized videos the
majority of the revenue goes to rightsholders); 2) leave them up and track
viewing statistics; or 3) block them from YouTube altogether. Content ID
compares videos uploaded to the site against those reference files,
automatically identifies the content, and applies the rightsholder’s
preferred policy.
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE
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Content ID participants, in fact, have many choices. If they don’t want to run
ads, they can just block uploads that include content matches. Or they can
block full uploads (e.g., a complete song) while monetizing or allowing
shorter clips. Revenue splits are possible if the uploader is trying to monetize
her stream, or the copyright claimant may demand all the money. The
Content ID claimant may also choose to block the video if the uploader is
trying to monetize her own uploads, but not block the video and just run ads
on it if she’s not.
According to Google, as of 2014, more than five thousand entities use
Content ID, including “major US network broadcasters, movie studios and
record labels,” with more than twenty-five million reference files in Google’s
database.39 More than 200 million videos have been claimed through Content
ID,40 leading to the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars in ad
revenue.41 Indeed, Content ID claims make up one-third of monetized
YouTube views.42 According to the recording industry itself, it is “making
more money from fan-made mashups, lip-syncs and tributes on YouTube
than from official music videos.”43
What this means in terms of marketers’ access to data on their audiences
remains to be seen, or more likely unseen.44 Data collection underlies
Google’s increasingly successful monetization of YouTube. To the extent
that centralized commercial “sharing” platforms replace other sources for
video—including individual webpages and cloud storage services—privacy
interests will be profoundly affected. Google aggregates video-watching data,
search data, email, and other information about users for its own commercial
benefit, and YouTube is a vital part of that strategy, even if the revenues
have to be shared with copyright owners.
DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF GOOGLE 3 (Nov. 13, 2013),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/google_comments.pdf [hereinafter GOOGLE
NTIA COMMENTS].
39. Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited
May 4, 2014).
40. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4.
41. Statistics, supra note 39.
42. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4.
43. Joel Eastwood, Recording Industry Earns More from Fan Videos than from Official Music
Videos, THESTAR.COM (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.thestar.com/entertainment/music/
2014/03/18/recording_industry_earns_more_from_fan_videos_than_from_official_music_
videos.html.
44. Google’s deep pockets, which allowed it to create Content ID and to negotiate
deals with major content owners, depend on integrating data across its platforms. YouTube
is a piece of its data collection and an increasingly important one. The scanning, data
analysis, and large scale of Content ID are a part of what makes privacy concerns so salient
online.
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As much as major copyright owners hate Google,45 they are enthusiastic
about hailing Content ID as a technology that will obviate the need for fair
use. In a Green Paper released in 2013, the government suggested that
Content ID could provide a model for “less risky” licensing alternatives to
fair use.46 Many copyright owners interpret “less risky” to mean “appropriate
substitute for.”47 Even the Association of American Publishers, which
doesn’t represent copyright owners who own works Content ID can
recognize, touted Content ID as evidence that there was no need for any
legal solicitude for remixing.48 Google’s limited success in identifying songs
45. It is hard to fully document the visceral distaste for the search giant that I have
seen expressed by representatives of major copyright owners, though reading through the
Green Paper comments cited herein might give a bit of the flavor. They don’t like that
Google makes money from the existence of their content, one way or another, and they
don’t like that Google continues to index search results that allow users who are looking for
unauthorized streams or downloads to find them, even though it also takes down millions of
infringing results. Without mentioning Google specifically, Jessica Litman has given a general
description of the climate of distrust and anger that surrounds much copyright discourse
(though she might well think I’m contributing to it). See generally Jessica Litman, The Politics of
Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313 (2009).
46. Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE INTERNET POLICYY TASK FORCE 29 (July 2013), available at http://
www.uspto.gov/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf (identifying Content ID as
“[p]articularly promising” because it enabled users to make remixes, not just copies).
47. See, e.g., NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 5 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/motion_picture_association_of_america_comments.pdf
[hereinafter MPAA NTIA COMMENTS] (discussing both Content ID, labeled “Content
Management System” by the MPAA, and Kindle Worlds as appropriate frameworks for
licensing remixes); NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, COMMENTS OF NATIONAL MUSIC PUBLISHERS’
ASSOCIATION 3–4 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
national_music_publishers_association
_et._al._comments.pdf (“[T]he authors of all ‘derivative works’—including mash-ups,
remixes, and those works incorporating digital samples—must always license the pre-existing
material (both sound recordings and underlying musical compositions) because there is a
viable commercial marketplace in existence for the licensing of these works . . . .”) (emphasis
added); NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF RECORDING INDUSTRY
OF AMERICA, INC. 6–7 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
recording_industry_association_of_america_comments.pdf (claiming that licensing through
YouTube is a flexible response to new uses).
48. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF ASSOCIATION OF
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and video is now being offered as evidence that automated procedures
“generally” can identify copyrighted works of all kinds across the entire
Internet.49 As with Getty Images, however, Content ID’s architectures of
control serve particular private interests, not the copyright system as a whole.
Content ID’s limitations are both practical and conceptual, and greater
reliance on Content ID in lieu of fair use would harm freedom of expression
and increase Google’s market dominance, to the detriment of creativity.
1. The Heavy Hand of Automatic Control: No Filters for Fairness
Like Getty Images, Content ID doesn’t involve typical copyright licenses.
Content ID is an arrangement with Google, not with individual uploaders,
who don’t receive any rights.50 Even if Content ID is a license, it is not a
blanket license. Content ID participants retain the right, and often exercise
the power, to suppress uses they don’t like—precisely the uses that are most
likely to be critical, uncomfortable, or otherwise transformative.51
Because Content ID does not require claimants to disclose their rules for
what content will be blocked or monetized, it’s hard to identify traditional
attempts to suppress disfavored viewpoints. The censor’s hand, however,
operates even when it operates lightly. Content ID always allows the claimant
to choose its preferred treatment of an identified work. And this explicit
control is joined by the more subtle shaping of culture that occurs when
AMERICAN PUBLISHERS 2 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
association_of_american_publishers_comments.pdf (arguing that remix culture doesn’t need
specific legal protection because “there is clear evidence that content and technology
companies are working together on this issue to create market solutions, such as YouTube’s
Content ID system”).
49. Notice and Takedown Provisions under the DMCA § 512: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6–7 (2014)
(testimony of Sean M. O’Connor, Professor of Law and Founding Director, Entrepreneurial
Law Clinic, University of Washington (Seattle)), available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/
?a,=Files.Serve&File_id=F87934CD-04E2-4A6F-84DF-01CB91919B63 (“We know that
Content ID and other systems are reasonably effective at identifying copyright works
generally.”).
50. See DEVIANTART NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 35, at 29 n.72 (“The greatest
drawback of the YouTube process is that copyright owners license YouTube only. The
license does not ‘pass through’ to the user who generated the work and who may have
created a derivative work. The user remains an infringer while the redistribution becomes
licensed.”).
51. See, e.g., Katie Allen, Google Seeks to Turn a Profit from YouTube Copyright Clashes, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/nov/01/googleyoutube-monetise-content/ (reporting that video content owners block about 20% of
detected uses “for reasons such as a user piggybacking on footage to push their own website
or because the use does not fit the original’s values,” for example when the original is “a
family brand” and the use isn’t family-friendly).
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remix artists internalize the limits imposed by copyright owners and avoid
certain music or other content that is always blocked on YouTube, sacrificing
better artistic results in order to keep their work available on a broader
platform.
Unsurprisingly, one result of Content ID’s affordances is that copyright
owners suppress messages that aren’t acceptable to them. Jonathan McIntosh
created a remix that criticized the Twilight series for its regressive gender
stereotypes, and found his work blocked because he refused, on moral
grounds, to allow the copyright owner of Twilight to profit from his work. In
other words, the owner used Content ID suppress criticism. McIntosh’s
work was ultimately restored, but his situation was unusual because he
managed to get enough publicity and legal assistance to establish that his
work was protected by fair use.52 In another reported case, a noncommercial
video analyzing remix culture and copyright law, which used clips from a
viral remix video that itself combined a song with video clips from John
Hughes films, was taken down as a result of a Content ID claim. The
creator’s appeal was “rejected,” despite Google’s promise that an appeal of a
Content ID determination would force the claimant to resort to the DMCA
process.53 Google’s contracts with some Content ID partners even allow
them to override DMCA counternotifications, lifting from copyright owners
the burden of filing suit to challenge uses that uploaders would be willing to
litigate to defend.54
Content ID can directly conflict with copyright’s incentive system. To
the extent that a video has copyrightable elements that aren’t owned by the
claimant, the claimant has no legal right to exploit those elements. Although
it might have the right to remove the video, that is different from having the
right to monetize it; Content ID allows the latter as the price of not
removing the work, even if the video isn’t an infringing derivative work but is
instead a fair use. In such cases, claimants are appropriating noninfringing
52. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, COMMENTS OF ORGANIZATION FOR TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS

(“OTW”) 72–73 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
NTIA
organization_for_transformative_works_comments.pdf
[hereinafter
OTW
COMMENTS].
53. Mike Masnick, Video About Fair Use, Remix & Culture Taken Down Over Copyright
Claim (Of Course), TECHDIRT.COM (Nov. 8, 2012, 7:27 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20121107/18062520968/video-about-fair-use-remix-culture-taken-down-overcopyright-claim-course.shtml.
54. See Google, Videos Removed or Blocked Due to Youtube's Contractual Obligations,
GOOGLE. COM, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3045545/ (last visited Aug.
14, 2014).

1447-1488_TUSHNET_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1462

2/12/15 5:42 PM

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1447

copyrighted works for their own benefit—something that in other contexts
the same claimants are very happy to call “piracy.” 55 Copyright owners have
used Content ID to control revenues from standard reviews and reporting—
classic fair uses even when done for profit—funneling money away from the
creators of those reviews.56 One reviewer points out that he’s now forced to
choose between the quality of his review, which often depends on illustrating
a point with evidence, and his ability to earn a living.57
Separately, there are numerous reports of misidentification and abuse of
Content ID by claimants who don’t even have legitimate claims to
components of user-uploaded videos.58 Major rightsholders, such as the
Harry Fox Agency (which licenses musical works), assert rights over works
that are plainly in the public domain.59 In order to dispute such invalid
55. See Mona Ibrahim, Deconstructing Let’s Play, Copyright, and the YouTube Content ID
Claim System: A Legal Perspective, GAMASUTRA.COM (Dec. 12, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://
www.gamasutra.com/blogs/MonaIbrahim/20131212/206912/
Deconstructing_Lets_Play_Copyright_and_the_YouTube_Content_ID_Claim_System_A_
Legal_Perspective.php.
56. Owen Good, Game Critic Says YouTube Copyright Policy Threatens His Livelihood
[Update], KOTAKU.COM (Dec. 12, 2013), http://kotaku.com/game-critic-says-youtubecopyright-policy-threatens-his-1482117783/ (reporting that Content ID has deprived a
videogame critic of the ability to earn ad revenue from his videogame reviews and
interviews, thus threatening his livelihood).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Tim Cushing, Copyright Killbots Strike Again: Official DNC Livestream Taken
Down By Just About Every Copyright Holder, TECHDIRT.COM (Sept. 5, 2012, 1:32 AM), http://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20120904/22172920275/copyright-killbots-strike-again-officialdnc-livestream-taken-down-just-about-every-copyright-holder.shtml
(reporting
that
automated content protection measures suppressed a stream of an awards show because
officially licensed clips from Dr. Who were present, but the automated system couldn’t
detect the licensing; the same thing happened to the Democratic National Convention’s
official channel, on behalf of multiple copyright claimants); Owen Good, The Most Ridiculous
Victim of YouTube’s Crackdown is a BASIC Game, KOTAKU.COM (Dec. 17, 2013), http://
kotaku.com/the-most-ridiculous-victim-of-youtubes-crackdown-is-a-1484998183/
(“This
guy just got flagged for a playthrough video of a game. A game he programmed.”); Ben
Jones, Why YouTube’s Automated Copyright Takedown System Hurts Artists, TORRENTFREAK.COM
(Feb. 23, 2014), http://torrentfreak.com/why-youtubes-automated-copyright-takedownsystem-hurts-artists-140223/ (arguing that Content ID ignores fair use and allows multiple
claims; one artist explains: “It is up to me to prove myself innocent by asking eighteen
different publishing companies through an automated system to revoke the automated
claims. Each publisher has a month to reply, with no obligation to even do so. If even one of
the eighteen publishers says ‘nope’ then it’s back to square one . . . . Any financial loss or
restrictions on my channel are entirely on me, and will not be compensated for once the
claim is lifted.”).
59. See Mike Masnick, Harry Fox Agency Claims Copyright Over Public Domain Work By
Johann Strauss, TECHDIRT.COM (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:02 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20121102/13164120919/harry-fox-agency-claims-copyright-over-public-domainwork-johann-strauss.shtml; Chris Morran, YouTube’s Content ID System Will Take Away Your
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claims, individual users have to know enough law to be willing to face down
a large entity. Abusive claimants may well simply reinstate a claim after a
challenge, as Harry Fox did with the 164-year-old Radetzky March by Johann
Strauss. Even an invalid claim can prevent a legitimate uploader from
monetizing a work for thirty days.60
Though Google has made efforts to improve the transparency of the
claiming process, there are still frequent reports of problems, and, unlike a
fair use assertion that can ultimately be litigated, a Content ID rejection is
unreviewable. The automated nature of Content ID can lead to extreme
frustration, since creators may be unable to reach a human with responsibility
for a decision.61 It is likely that the percentage of troublesome Content ID
determinations is quite low. But because the volume of uploads to YouTube
is so large, even a small percentage of problematic “matches” can translate
into large absolute numbers, and fair uses are disproportionately likely to be
found in that population, since fair uses that involve quoting audio or video
will produce Content ID matches.
Commendably, Google acknowledges that Content ID is not a substitute
for fair use. Google notes that even an endeavor with the scale of Content
ID simply can’t keep up with the massive volume of copyrighted content
online.62 Further, even if an automated system could identify every
Money If You Dare Sing “Silent Night,” CONSUMERIST.COM (Dec. 26, 2013), http://
consumerist.com/2013/12/26/youtubes-content-id-system-will-take-away-your-money-ifyou-dare-sing-silent-night/ (“YouTuber Adam ‘The Alien’ Manley ran up against the idiocy
of Content ID twice in the last week, with multiple music publishers claiming that his recent
rendition of ‘Silent Night’ violated their copyright, in spite of the fact that the song, an
English version of a nearly 200-year-old German Christmas carol . . . has been in the public
domain for more than a few years.”).
60. See Morran, supra note 59 (“When a monetized video is flagged, YouTube takes
away the ads and therefore any money that clip would be earning, which would be fine if
Content ID weren’t such a tin-eared agent bent in favor of the recording industry.”).
61. Owen Good, YouTube’s Copyright Crackdown: Everything You Need To Know,
KOTAKU.COM (Dec. 18, 2013), http://kotaku.com/youtubes-copyright-crackdown-simpleanswers-to-compli-1485999937/ (“When people are told they are violating a law or a rule,
they expect to be able to confront or reason with the enforcer of that rule or the person
they’ve wronged, however unwittingly. With a YouTube scanning program making these
calls on behalf of others, who sometimes aren’t aware of the claims made in their name, it
can be very hard to get someone on the line to hash things out.”).
62. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4 (“As an initial matter, Content ID
will never include reference files for every copyrighted work that might be included in every
remix uploaded to the site. While Content ID currently has over 15 million reference files in
its database, that represents a tiny fraction of all the audio, video, and imagery that falls
within the scope of copyright. In other words, no matter how comprehensive Content ID’s
database of reference files may one day become, there will always be an important role for
fair use when it comes to remixes on YouTube.”).
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copyrighted work, it couldn’t identify which were fair uses. Content ID
doesn’t analyze transformativeness, the amount of the work taken, or other
fair use factors. Google recognizes that a copyright owner who hasn’t chosen
to use Content ID to monetize uploads could simply block a fair use, or an
owner could monetize an upload despite having no right to do so.63 As
Google notes, “[t]he second case can be particularly galling to a remix creator
whose fair use video is intended as a criticism or parody of the rightsholder
or work in question.”64 Google contends that it offers procedures to
ameliorate these problems,65 but they still rely on users understanding and
exercising their fair use rights in the face of a complex and often-changing
process that doesn’t seem to work as well in practice as Google claims it
does.66
2. Competition: Crowding Out Smaller Creators and Newer Intermediaries
Content ID’s reliance on a private company’s technology and selfinterest, instead of on copyright law, creates other systemic issues. Content
ID, like Getty Images, has anticompetitive elements, both in terms of
creators and in terms of intermediaries. On the creator side, only large
aggregators who own the rights to popular content are entitled to use
Content ID: “[t]o be approved, [copyright owners] must own exclusive rights
to a substantial body of original material that is frequently uploaded by the
YouTube user community.” 67 To those who have, more is given.68 Smaller
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id.
65. Id.; id. at 5 n.10 (explaining the dispute and appeal process).
66. Google also suggests that rightsholders should adopt best practices to prevent
overclaiming; it does not contend that rightsholders routinely follow this advice. Id. at 5–6.
Still, Google’s modest conclusion is that “intermediary licensing can be a pragmatic,
efficient, scalable solution to some of the legal uncertainties facing some remix creators with
respect to some copyrighted works. These kinds of content identification and licensing
systems should be viewed as a supplement to other mechanisms, such as fair use and ‘best
practices’ efforts . . . [to] facilitate noninfringing forms of remix creativity.” Id. at 6 (footnote
omitted).
67. How Content ID Works, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
2797370?hl=en (last visited May 4, 2014). In addition, for understandable reasons, Google
requires Content ID participants to have exclusive rights to their works—people who make
remixes or derivative works that could otherwise be commercialized still can’t use Content
ID, nor can people who use Creative Commons noncommercial licenses. Qualifying for
Content ID, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1311402 (last visited
May 4, 2014).
68. Individual artists may occasionally qualify for Content ID, but they don’t make
much money from it. Independent musician Zoë Keating explained: “I had about 2 million
views in 2013 but nearly all of them are 3rd party videos. If I choose to monetize them I get,
I think, 35% of the revenue share (the total revenue share being 55% to the copyright
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entities can send DMCA takedown notices, but they can’t use Content ID to
monetize or otherwise take advantage of the virality of their works on
YouTube. Moreover, Google has recently suggested that it will block videos
from musicians who refuse to sign up with its new subscription streamingmedia service and who want to continue to rely on advertising instead,
meaning that popular “indie” artists such as Adele could be excluded.69
(Google seems to hope that Chris Anderson was right when he argued that
free content could be used as a gateway drug: “[p]eople will pay if you make
them (once they’re hooked).”70) Though such musicians could still send
DMCA notices, they might not be able to use Content ID without signing a
broader deal with Google.71 Although it’s not clear how this subscription
service will affect remix videos posted by third parties,72 what is clear is that
Google is already using its growing power to shape the music video market.
On the intermediary side, licensing schemes presuppose that some larger
entity will negotiate with rightsholders, given that individual users have
neither the knowledge nor the ability to negotiate licenses. Yet most sites

holders and 45% to Google). Given that, 3rd party videos will never amount to much. In my
case I think of the 6,565 videos Youtube CMS has found so far, 90% of them are smalltime
dance performances, rehearsals, films, art projects etc.” Zoë Keating Puts Her Revenue Figures
Into Perspective, HYPEBOT.COM (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2014/03/
zo%C3%AB-keating-puts-her-revenue-figures-into-perspective.html. Keating also objects to
the fact that she can’t control the ads that will run when she opts to monetize using Content
ID; they include ads for products she doesn’t support. Id. Because the backlash from fans
when their videos are claimed isn’t worth the small amount of money she receives, Keating
has decided to end monetization of her works and instead target only commercial film, TV,
and advertising uses. Id.
69. See Ben Popper, Youtube Will Block Videos from Artists Who Don’t Sign Up for Its Paid
Streaming Service, THE VERGE (June 17, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/6/17/
5817408/youtube-reportedly-block-videos-indie-artists/.
70. CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE 242 (2009).
71. See Sandra Aistars, Why Are Artists Disappearing from the Internet?, THE HILL (June 24,
2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/210113-why-are-artists-disappearing
-from-the-internet/ (reporting that “[r]umors are that those who do not accept YouTube’s
take-it-or-leave-it licensing deal for its new streaming service will be barred from offering
their own channels on YouTube and prevented from using tools like Content ID to identify
their music when it is posted by others without authorization,” though ignoring the DMCA
when claiming that this scheme means that unauthorized, infringing versions will stay up so
that Google alone can profit).
72. A leaked version of the contract appears to include “User Video with Provider
Sound Recording” in the list of content to which Google will have the ability to apply its
new subscription rules, which would cover many common forms of remix, but how this
would work in practice is not yet public. See Paul Resnikoff, F*&K It: Here’s the Entire
YouTube Contract for Indies . . . , DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (June 23, 2014), http://www.digital
musicnews.com/permalink/2014/06/23/fk-heres-entire-youtube-contract-indies/.
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can’t afford the investment required to create a Content ID–like system. As
the visual art site DeviantART explained:
YouTube’s content identification system . . . is very complex and
very expensive. It requires registration of works, digital
fingerprinting and a constant review and frequent interdiction of
incoming user generated content. . . . It hopefully goes without
saying that very few enterprises can afford this approach. The
technology required to (i) store metadata, (ii) identify works at
nanosecond speeds, (iii) seamlessly execute on permission sets after
identification, (iv) place advertising inventory in front of the work
and finally (v) generate a revenue share payment to the copyright
owners reflects a level of engineering excellence also beyond the
reach of most enterprises.73

Google itself has argued that its system is not an appropriate model for
the Internet in general, pointing out that Content ID’s development was
incredibly expensive (costing approximately thirty million to sixty million
dollars)74 and resource-intensive, requiring more than 50,000 engineering
hours.75 Startup competitors couldn’t replicate it.76
Moreover, YouTube’s Content ID is a system put in place by a currently
dominant market participant. But we do not know what markets will look
like in ten years. YouTube hasn’t yet been around for a decade. To conclude
that current intermediaries have solved the problem of licensing poses
significant risks on both sides. On the one hand, the licensing model risks
entrenching YouTube’s near-monopoly on the market because other
competitors do not have access to the same licensed content.77 As we’ve seen
with the nightmare that is digital-radio licensing, new entrants can rarely cut

73. DEVIANTART NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 35, at 28–29 (footnote omitted).
74. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4 (“more than $30 million”); Hearing
on S. 512 of Title 17 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6 (2014) (testimony of Katherine Oyama, Senior Copyright
Policy Counsel, Google Inc.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/be93d452945a-4fff-83ec-b3f51de782b3/031314-testimony---oyama.pdf [hereinafter Testimony of
Katherine Oyama] (“more than $60 million”).
75. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4.
76. See Testimony of Katherine Oyama, supra note 74 (“YouTube could never have
launched as a small start-up in 2005 if it had been required by law to first build a system like
Content ID.”).
77. Cf. Jeff Macke, E-Book Ruling Cements Amazon’s Virtual Monopoly, YAHOO
FINANCE—BREAKOUT (July 11, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/e-bookruling-cements-amazon-virtual-monopoly-150844210.html (noting Amazon’s increasing
monopoly over e-book content).

1447-1488_TUSHNET_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

INNOVATION IN COPYRIGHT LICENSING

2/12/15 5:42 PM

1467

the same deals as earlier ones.78 On the other hand, YouTube could go the
way of AOL’s walled garden, Blackberry, MySpace, AltaVista, and many
other formerly dominant digital entities, and its licensing “solutions” will
decline and fall with it. Whether or not Google is too big to fail, its present
existence shouldn’t be used to delegitimize fair use.
Content ID is a successful monetization model for large copyright
owners of popular online video content. But it is not, despite those owners’
claims, an appropriate substitute for fair use generally. It gives some
copyright owners too great an ability to suppress disfavored uses, leaves
other owners (including fair users) out in the cold, and hands Google too
much power to structure creative markets.

C.

KINDLE WORLDS: PAID TO PLAY?

Recently, Amazon’s Kindle Worlds has been added to Content ID as
major copyright owners’ proof of concept that licensing is always available,
and that all creativity should be monetized.79 Kindle Worlds content is
78. See, e.g., Rick Marshall, The Quest for “Parity”: An Examination of the Internet Radio
Fairness Act, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 445 (2013) (examining some of the multiple
different licensing regimes applicable to entities based on their size, technologies, and
whether they existed in 1998).
79. See NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF
COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE 5 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at https://copyrightalliance.org/
sites/default
/files/final_copyright_alliance_iptf_reply_comment.pdf (arguing that licensing “demonstrates a
vibrant and legal market for remixes,” including Kindle Worlds, which allows “creators of
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available only through Amazon’s website. The program builds on and
distorts the concept of “fan fiction,” new unauthorized stories written by
fans (or sometimes anti-fans) of an existing copyrighted work.80 Online, fan
fiction circulates noncommercially. In Kindle Worlds, by contrast, both
author and copyright owner receive payment when a reader buys a Kindle
Worlds ebook, as does Amazon. This makes it the most directly monetized
of the new semi-blanket, semi-licensing initiatives. Relatedly, it’s the most
limited in terms of participation. Most content owners are still nervous about
“letting” other people make money using their works.81 Moreover, extensive
participation by film and television properties is unlikely, given standard
fan fiction to easily make commercially profitable uses of the underlying works”); MPAA
NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 47, at 5 (same). Another author has confidently asserted that
Kindle Worlds precludes a fair use defense for fan fiction, at least for non-sexually explicit
fan fiction, showing a serious but unsurprising misunderstanding of fair use doctrine:
By licensing fan-fiction publication rights to Amazon, Alloy adds Kindle
Worlds to the “potential market” considered in fair use’s fourth factor
(“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work”). As free fan-fiction would naturally (and negatively)
impact a market, a court is likely to find that this factor favors the
copyright owner, Alloy.
Arguably, fan-fiction rated R and NC-17 should be excluded here, given
that Kindle Worlds’ . . . “Content Guidelines” prohibit “[p]ornography”
and “[o]ffensive [c]ontent ” . . . . Ergo, sites featuring only blue fan-fiction
do not impact the same market(s) as their unobscene peers.
Hence, Kindle Worlds gives Alloy and Amazon an incentive to seek
damages and the shutdown of free fanfiction sites . . . , and places the
odds of winning firmly in their favor. Over time, fear of large damage
awards and litigation costs would likely lead to voluntary site shutdowns
and the gradual extinction of free fan-fiction.
And thus, what is currently an impetus to pay for fan-fiction could
become a necessity . . . .
Sarah Katz, Amazon Kindle Worlds: Fan-Fiction’s New Normal, SCREEN INVASION (May 29,
2014), http://screeninvasion.com/2014/05/amazon-kindle-worlds-fan-fictions-new-normal.
80. See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997).
81. For another recently announced example of allowing “fans” to share in some
material benefits from monetization, see Hasbro’s very small line of authorized My Little Pony
“fan art” sculptures, now available for purchase. SUPERFANART.COM (last visited Aug. 14,
2014). The five authorized artists there represent a tiny fraction of My Little Pony fan artists
and sculptors, most of whom would never make the cut. For example, it’s impossible to
imagine Hasbro licensing Mari Kasurinen, who makes My Little Pony mashups with other
pop icons from Alien to the X-Men. See Angela Watercutter, Gallery: Iron Man, Other Pop Icons
Become My Little Pony Sculptures, WIRED (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/09/mylittle-pony-pop-icons/?viewall=true (explaining that Kasurinen’s work addresses materialism,
individualism, children’s socialization through toys, and how people use custom objects to
show status).
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Writers’ Guild of America contracts requiring payment to the writers of the
initial scripts.82 Thus, participation in Kindle Worlds is restricted to handpicked franchises, rather than huge blocks of corporate-owned content. The
fan fiction generated by the broader universe of popular TV shows and
movies, which are generally the most popular inspirations for fan fiction,
must continue to rely on fair use.
1. Control: Building the Fence and Culling the Herd
Even if Kindle Worlds could license every popular media property, it
would remain highly constrained, and would not substitute for
transformative fair uses. The language of control and exploitation
predominates even in favorable descriptions of Kindle Worlds. Fans are raw
material, resources to be exploited, and data to be mined.83 Reflecting these
perceptions of fan authors, Kindle Worlds is a bad deal for creators
compared to other forms of commercial authorship (which are not known
for their massive payouts in the first place).84 Kindle Worlds authors give up
many more rights than conventional authors.85 Fifty Shades of Grey, the
bestselling erotic novel that began as Twilight fan fiction, provides an
instructive contrast. While there are questions surrounding the book’s
transition from fanwork to paid work,86 and while some fans of the fan
fiction series felt exploited by the author’s use of their enthusiasm to convert
82. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright Society: Fan Productions, REBECCA TUSHNET’S
43(B)LOG (June 9, 2014, 3:20 PM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/06/copyrightsociety-fan-productions.html (reporting comments of Matt Bloomgarden, VP Business &
Legal Affairs, Alloy Entertainment/Warner Bros. Television).
83. See, e.g., Alexandra Alter, ‘Vampire Diaries’ Writer Bites Back, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17,
2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304058204579495491652398358/
(“Now, entertainment companies are searching for new ways to make money off fan writing
and harness the next potential breakout hit. . . . ‘At the very least, it’s additional promotion,
and in the best-case scenario, there are ideas for new properties that we can mine’ [the
president of a major Kindle Worlds participant said].”).
84. Alter, supra note 72 (“Amazon grants fan-fiction writers 35% of net revenue for
works that are 10,000 words or longer, and 20% of revenue for shorter works. But that’s
much smaller than the 70% of royalties that a self-published author can get for an original
work published through Amazon.”); Francesca Coppa, Fuck Yeah, Fandom is Beautiful, 2
J. FANDOM STUD. 73, 80 (2014) (stating that Kindle Worlds is “inserting itself into the
process by which some fans become professionals, and potentially taking a cut of those
creative works large enough to stop most people from making a living at it”).
85. See Alter, supra note 83 (quoting Francesca Coppa, an English professor at
Muhlenberg College, who says, “It feels like a land grab. . . . Big companies are trying to
insert themselves explicitly to get people who don’t know any better to sign away rights to
things that might be profitable.”).
86. Bethan Jones, Fifty Shades of Exploitation: Fan Labor and Fifty Shades of Grey, 15
TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS & CULTURES (2014), available at http://journal.
transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/501/422.
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her work into a commercial success, it’s notable that the economic payoff for
Fifty Shades was far greater than that available through Kindle Worlds. By
“filing off the serial numbers” and converting the story into one that no
longer starred Bella and Edward from Twilight, but rather a more generic
insecure young woman and powerful older man, the writer E.L. James was
able to become the world’s highest-earning author, keeping a much larger
percentage of her earnings than available through Kindle Worlds.87 In
addition, she was able to sell the movie rights, something else Kindle Worlds
doesn’t allow.
Kindle Worlds may be fandom’s “Sugarhill moment,” in Abigail
DeKosnik’s words: “the moment when an outsider takes up a subculture’s
invention and commodifies it for the mainstream before insiders do.”88
DeKosnik’s prescient words evoke what happened to rap music, where a
relatively few people made millions of dollars, but many of them didn’t come
from the communities that originated the form; instead, rap musicians were
integrated into the large-scale commercial music system, and rarely saw much
economic benefit from it.89
With commercial exploitation comes a lack of creative freedom. Even
more explicitly than Getty Images or Content ID, Kindle Worlds has serious
content restrictions. To begin, Amazon bans the popular “crossover” genre,
in which characters or settings from one world intersect with another. Sex
and violence are, naturally, risky topics. Although Amazon is coy about the
limits of its ban on sexually explicit content—it wouldn’t want to lose out on
the next Fifty Shades of Grey—Amazon retains broad discretion to police the
appropriateness of content. It appears that, in light of Amazon’s history of
suppressing gay and lesbian content and “kinky” content,90 explicit sexuality
is more likely to survive if it is otherwise conventionally heterosexual. And
because Amazon maintains tethered control over “purchased” copies, any
work may be pulled or edited for causing controversy, and its content will
disappear from users’ devices. Kindle Worlds works aren’t available in print,
so any suppression will be total, hard to document, and perhaps even
87.
88.
89.
90.

Alter, supra note 83 (reporting that James made an estimated $95 million in 2013).
Abigail De Kosnik, Should Fan Fiction Be Free?, 48 CINEMA J. 118, 119–20 (2009).
See id.
See, e.g., Pete Cashmore, Amazon Accused of Removing Gay Books from Rankings,
MASHABLE (Apr. 12, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/04/12/amazon-accused-ofremoving-gay-books-from-rankings/ (describing previous controversy over Amazon making
LGBT content harder to find); Adam L. Penenburg, Amazon’s Monster Porn Purge,
PANDODAILY (Jan. 1, 2014), http://pando.com/2014/01/01/amazons-monster-pornpurge/ (describing Amazon’s fluctuating bans on unusual sexual content based on its
prohibition of “pornography” and “offensive depictions of graphic sexual acts”).
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unnoticed, unlike suppression of a printed work, where copies may survive
the censor’s sweep.91
Each copyright owner may impose an additional set of limits, which
makes prediction about content rules even more difficult. For example,
Bloodshot ’s “world” includes multiple restrictions, from standard bans on
“erotica” and “offensive content” to the vague requirement that characters
be “in-character,” along with bans on “profane language,” graphic violence,
“references to acquiring, using, or being under the influence of illegal drugs,”
and “wanton disregard for scientific and historical accuracy.” 92 In G.I. Joe
works, meanwhile, the character Snake Eyes can’t be portrayed as a Yankees
fan.93 While this control is perfectly appropriate from the perspective of
copyright owners claiming absolute rights over their works,94 it also
suppresses the most transformative and critical reworkings.
In addition, Amazon requires writers to be at least eighteen years old,
excluding the many young people who discover, and benefit so much from,
creative fandom. Lawyers may consider such restrictions routine because of
minors’ inability to contract unvoidably, but in the unlicensed,
noncontractual worlds of fandom, young people are often the most active
participants, discovering their artistic talents for the first time. Many of the
benefits that writing in an existing world can offer, in terms of developing
literacy and other skills, are particularly valuable for younger creators.95
Young writers often lack access to supportive communities; in
noncommercial fan-fiction communities, others’ enthusiasm for the shared
world translates into assistance with writers’ development, since everyone
wants more stories.96 But who would routinely pay money to help a writer
develop and improve her skills? When markets are involved, we are rarely
happy paying for someone else’s training, and we usually consider our money
payment enough without additional feedback to assist artistic improvement.
But Kindle Worlds does not allow authors to circulate works for free, even if
young authors were allowed to use it.
91. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html (reporting on
an earlier instance of Amazon’s content erasure).
92. See Bloodshot, KINDLE WORLDS, https://kindleworlds.amazon.com/world/
Bloodshot/ (last visited May 21, 2014).
93. Alter, supra note 83.
94. See Copyright Alliance, supra note 79, at 6 (claiming falsely that copyright law always
protects creators “from having their works used in advertising against their will, to cast them
in an unflattering light, or by groups or individuals morally or politically opposed to them”)
(footnotes omitted).
95. See OTW NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 38 –61.
96. See id.
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Kindle Worlds additionally requires works to be of a certain length,
which is understandable for a commercial enterprise but deadly for social
practices that thrive on spontaneity, experimentation, and flexibility.
Although fannish poetry has a long history, there will be no Vampire Diaries
sonnets on Amazon. The innovations of noncommercial remix are unlikely
to take root in such sanitized soil. As media scholar Catherine Tosenberger
argues, fanworks are meant to be “unpublishable,” which leaves their
creators free to disregard traditional publishing conventions. This lack of
commercial consequence
allows people to stake claims over texts that they wouldn’t normally
be allowed to if they wanted to publish, and frees them to tell the
stories they want to tell. You can do things in fanfiction that would
be difficult or impossible to do in fiction intended for commercial
publication, such as experiments with form and subject matter that
don’t fit with prevailing tastes . . . . It’s a way of asserting rights of
interpretation over texts that may be patriarchal, heteronormative,
and/or contain only adult-approved representations of children
and teenagers.97

It’s in these unpublishable works that new types of creativity and
otherwise marginalized creators are free to develop. We don’t know what
other new forms Amazon’s content, age, and format restrictions will
preclude—and that’s the problem.
97. Henry Jenkins, Gender and Fan Studies (Round Five, Part One): Geoffrey Long and
Catherine Tosenberger, CONFESSIONS OF AN ACA-FAN (June 28, 2007), http://
henryjenkins.org/2007/06/gender_and_fan_studies_round_f_1.html; see also Henry Jenkins,
Gender and Fan Studies (Round Five, Part One): Geoffrey Long and Catherine Tosenberger,
CONFESSIONS OF AN ACA-FAN (June 28, 2007), http://henryjenkins.org/2007/06/
gender_and_fan_studies_round_f_1.html; Catherine Tosenberger, Potterotics: Harry Potter
Fanfiction on the Internet 34–35 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Florida), available at http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0019605/00001 (“[F]andom is a space where
freedom to read and write whatever one wants are felt in a much more concrete way than in
more ‘official’ spaces. . . . Fanfiction is, in many ways, given life by what other spaces don’t
allow.”); Timothy B. Lee, Ars Book Review: “Here Comes Everybody” by Clay Shirky, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 3, 2008, 10:17 AM), http://arstechnica.com/articles/culture/book-review2008-04-1.ars/3 (discussing in an interview with Clay Shirky valuable group productions
whose transaction costs mean that they can only take place voluntarily, outside the market
and the firm); Liz Gannes, NTV Predictions: Online Video Stars, GIGAOM (Dec. 30, 2007, 9:00
AM),
http://gigaom.com/2007/12/30/ntv-predictions-online-video-stars/
(“Fans,
operating outside of the commercial mainstream, have the freedom to do things which
would be prohibited [to] those working at the heart of a media franchise—explore new
stories, adopt new aesthetics, offer alternative interpretations of characters, or just be bad in
whatever sense of the word you want. And much of the online video content thrives because
it is unpublishable in the mainstream but has strong appeal to particular niches and
subcultures.”) (quoting Henry Jenkins; alteration in original).
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2. Commodification: Undermining the Creative Spirit of Communities
Corralling fan fiction into Amazon’s ecosystem would exclude a huge
amount of creative energy, and many opportunities for educational and
creative development would be lost. But even if, counterfactually, Kindle
Worlds provided creative freedom, the context of a paid platform would still
work additional changes on the creative environment—distortions in
incentives that change the substance of the works created, and distortions in
the overall “market” for creative works. Getty embeds and Content ID
already raise issues of “digital sharecropping,” enabling large corporations to
profit from the uncompensated creative labor of individual producers. But
Amazon’s version of monetization, which offers creative individuals a small
share of the proceeds, is not an adequate alternative—certainly not as a
substitute for fair use.
Creativity, though it often comes from individuals, always arises from a
context, and can’t be understood without attention to creators’
communities.98 The basic issue with monetizing fan fiction is that organic,
noncommercial communities that create transformative remixes cannot
move into the commercial sector without being fundamentally altered and
diminished.99 The market changes what it swallows.
Begin with the consumption side: extensive research has shown that
people behave differently when they don’t have to pay money for a benefit.100

98. See R. KEITH SAWYER, EXPLAINING CREATIVITY: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN
INNOVATION 209 (2d. ed. 2012) (“Individual-level explanations are the most important
component of the explanation of creativity . . . . But individuals always create in contexts,
and a better understanding of those contexts is essential to a complete explanation of
creativity.”).
99. See OTW NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 62–75; Henry Jenkins, Afterword:
Communities of Readers, Clusters of Practices, in DIY MEDIA: CREATING, SHARING AND
LEARNING WITH NEW TECHNOLOGIES 231, 239 (Michele Knobel & Colin Lankshear eds.,
2010) (“Many web 2.0 sites provide far less scaffolding and mentorship than offered by
more grassroots forms of participatory culture. Despite a rhetoric of collaboration and
community, they often still conceive of their users as autonomous individuals whose primary
relationship is to the company that provides them services and not to each other.”).
100. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE
OUR DECISIONS 55–74 (2008) (describing research); David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A
New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49, 71–81 (2008) (same); Kristina Shampanier et al., Zero as a
Special Price: The True Value of Free Products, 26 MARKETING SCI. 742, 745–48 (2007)
(explaining the “zero price effect,” in which demand increases for chocolate candy reduced
from one cent to free, but decreases for an inexpensive but higher-quality alternative when
its price is also reduced by one cent but not to zero); see also ANDERSON, supra note 70
(book-length treatment of the power of “free”); Dan Ariely, The Power of Free Tattoos,
DANARIELY (Nov. 10, 2010), http://danariely.com/2010/11/10/the-power-of-free-
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Paying a single penny can change behavior substantially, even though it’s
essentially equivalent to zero in rational economic terms: “If you charge a
price, any price, we are forced to ask ourselves if we really want to open our
wallets. But if the price is zero, that flag never goes up and the decision just
got easier.”101 With fan fiction, that means people consume more—and
differently—when they can read for free. Any argument that free fan fiction
substitutes for what could otherwise be paid purchases ignores that
significant difference in decision-making.
“Free,” in increasing consumption, also decreases concern for quality.102
This change in preferences of course has downsides, but it also lowers
barriers to entry for new creators by providing an enthusiastic and often
quite forgiving audience. And since the usual path to good art involves
producing bad art first, this tolerance benefits the quality and variety of
creative expression in the long run. “Free” triggers gift and reciprocity
norms, which in the context of creative production support the development
of community through feedback, discussion, and the encouragement of
further participation as creators respond to each other.
Other profound effects of noncommerciality operate more directly on
creators. The empirical evidence indicates that noncommercial production in
a digital economy is not just detached from monetary exchange, but that it
can be subject to crowding out: noncommercial motives can be eliminated
when money is on offer, leading to less overall creativity and less social
benefit.103 Studies of creativity have shown that extrinsic rewards regularly
diminish creative motivations and the creativity of the resulting works, as
tattoos/ (concluding that “free” overwhelmed other potential concerns for consumers even
for permanent changes such as tattoos).
101. ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 59.
102. ARIELY, supra note 100, at 58.
103. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 94–95 (2006) (“Across many
different settings, researchers have found substantial evidence that, under some
circumstances, adding money for an activity previously undertaken without price
compensation reduces, rather than increases, the level of activity.”); Yochai Benkler, Sharing
Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114
YALE L.J. 273, 323–24 (2004) (“A simple statement of this model is that individuals have
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. . . . Extrinsic motivations are said to “crowd out” intrinsic
motivations because they (a) impair self-determination—that is, a person feels pressured by
an external force, and therefore feels overjustified in maintaining her intrinsic motivation
rather than complying with the will of the source of the extrinsic reward; or (b) impair selfesteem—they cause an individual to feel that his internal motivation is rejected, not valued,
leading him to reduce his self-esteem and thus to reduce effort.”); Bruno S. Frey & Felix
Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 746, 746 (1997).
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judged by objective evaluators. People in commercialized environments seem
to focus on the extrinsic reward, not on any enjoyment they might have
gotten from performing the creative activity.104 But not all extrinsic rewards
are the same. Money often decreases intrinsic creative motivation, while
positive feedback—the “currency” used in fan communities—enhances
intrinsic motivation.105 Fandom has long operated as a “gift economy.”106
People who enjoyed a fanwork are expected or exhorted to give feedback
and thanks, and within a community, people regularly make fanworks for
each other. These nonmonetized rewards can be understood as incentives,
but they have qualitatively different effects than money.
In the words of Cyndi Lauper, money changes everything. Sociologist
Viviana Zelizer explains that defining an activity as noncommercial changes
how people feel and reason about it compared to activities defined as
commercial.107 Specifically, money is corrosive of communities whose
members support each other:
It turns out that when [experimental] participants are paid with
goods that have clear monetary value but are not mediums of
exchange—like candy—they favor equal distribution [for work
they’d done as a group], and everyone gets the same share. When
participants are compensated with money, they favor a
compensation scheme in which everyone gets a share proportional
to the work he or she accomplished. As [Barry] Schwartz notes,
“Human beings are ‘unfinished animals’; what we can reasonably
expect of people depends on how our social institutions ‘finish’
them.”108

Money encourages people to think of themselves as autonomous actors, and
also to think of others that way, which means that they have less impetus to
104. See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights As Incentives: Did We Just Imagine
That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 50–53 (2011) (reviewing empirical evidence).
105. See Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 114 (1971); cf. Karim R. Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf,
Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software
Projects, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 1, 3 (J. Feller et al. eds.,
2005) (“We find . . . that enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation—namely, how creative a
person feels when working on the project—is the strongest and most persuasive driver.”).
106. See Karen Hellekson, A Fannish Field of Value: Online Fan Gift Culture, 48 CINEMA J.
113, 117 (2009) (noting that fandom’s gift economy is both protective against legal claims
and a way for fan communities to preserve their “own autonomy while simultaneously
solidifying the group”).
107. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994).
108. EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE 304 (2013) (citing Barry
Schwartz, Crowding Out Morality: How the Ideology of Self-Interest Can Be Self-Fulfilling, in
IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 160, 181 (Jon Hanson & John Jost eds., 2012)).
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support other people. Experimental research has shown that evoking the
concept of money, compared to evoking neutral concepts, leads people to
ask for less help and to be less willing to help others. People primed with the
concept of money “preferred to play alone, work alone, and put more
physical distance between themselves and a new acquaintance.”109 These
effects can occur even when people aren’t consciously aware of the
changes.110 Once money is in the picture, being reminded of community in
the form of friends and family doesn’t help; money still leads to greater
preferences for distance from others.111
Relatedly, the way in which money enters a relationship matters. One
benefit of a market system is that people don’t need to be friends with the
butcher and the baker to get food at the standard price. This is an important
freedom—but it also makes relationships less durable, compared with
relationships in which rewards take the form of entitlements or gifts.112
Kindle Worlds is a transactional, atomized economy: a reader pays a set price
and receives a set amount of content in return. Mel Stanfill notes that
Amazon is addressing fans as individuals only, rather than as people who
understand themselves as being committed to a larger community. As she
notes, Kindle Worlds “is part of a broader shift to incite fans-theindividuals . . . to ever greater investment and involvement but manage them
through disarticulating them from the troublesome resistive capacity of
fandom-the-community.”113
109. Kathleen D. Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCIENCE 1154,
1154, 1156 (2006) (“Relative to people not reminded of money, people reminded of money
reliably performed independent but socially insensitive actions. The magnitude of these
effects is notable and somewhat surprising, given that our participants were highly familiar
with money and that our manipulations were minor environmental changes or small tasks
for participants to complete.”) (citations omitted).
110. Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Merely Activating the Concept of Money Changes Personal and
Interpersonal Behavior, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 208 (2008) (finding that
even subtle reminders of money resulted in substantial behavior changes, including making
people less helpful than others not reminded of money as well as making people work
harder; reminders could be as subtle as rearranging word tasks where the words referenced
money, or a screensaver with a picture of money).
111. See id. at 210 (finding that reminders about money led to fewer charitable
donations).
112. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY
137 (2010) (“On the whole, entitlements and gifts imply a more durable social relation
between them than does compensation.”).
113. Mel Stanfill, Kindle Worlds II: The End of Fandom as We Know It?, MEL STANFILL (June
3, 2013, 7:48 AM), http://www.melstanfill.com/kindle-worlds-ii-the-end-of-fandom-as-weknow-it/ (citation omitted); see also Matt Bloomgarden, Fan-Fiction Overview, at 12
(presentation at copyright law conference by representative of content company participating
in Kindle Worlds, explaining “strategic benefits” of Kindle Worlds entirely in terms of
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Given the way in which Kindle Worlds is presented—as a series of
autonomous transactions—the volume and variety of fan creation will
predictably be much lower, to the long term detriment of fan culture. Before
the rise of the Internet, fans of Marion Zimmer Bradley’s groundbreaking,
popular Darkover universe wrote fan fiction extensively. Following a dispute
with a fan writer, Bradley purported to ban fan fiction, unless it was
published in one of the commercial anthologies she edited—a small-scale
precursor of Kindle Worlds. Fans mostly complied, and Darkover fandom
entered a downward slide from which it has never recovered.114 The
experience of American hip-hop likewise shows a decline of experimental
and political art as the industry converted to an always-license model.115
Meanwhile, copyright owners that learned not to suppress fan creativity or
corral it into “authorized” channels continue to have robust and profitable
fandoms, with prominent examples including Harry Potter, Star Wars, Twilight,
and Marvel’s comic book universes. Content industries touting the alwayslicense model are, it seems, eating their own seed corn—at least if fair use
doesn’t remain a robust alternative.
So far, Kindle Worlds is behaving as the existing evidence about
commercialization would lead one to expect, both in volume and content.
For example, the popular Pretty Little Liars series, created by the bookpackaging company Alloy, showed forty-six Kindle Worlds works in June
2014, while there were nearly 6000 such works on the popular Fanfiction.net
site; the smaller and younger Archive of Our Own hosted over 370.116 At a
copyright owner’s relation to the “fan base,” without mention of community or fan-to-fan
interaction).
114. AARON SCHWABACH, FAN FICTION AND COPYRIGHT: OUTSIDER WORKS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 112–14 (2011) (describing the dispute); id. at 116
(explaining that, after the creative fandom was suppressed, “Darkover . . . faded from the
prominence it enjoyed in genre fiction in the 1970s and 1980s”).
115. Erik Nielson, Did the Decline of Sampling Cause the Decline of Political Hip Hop?, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/
2013/09/did-the-decline-of-sampling-cause-the-decline-of-political-hip-hop/279791/.
116. See FANFICTION, https://www.fanfiction.net/tv/Pretty-Little-Liars/ (last visited
June 26, 2014) (reporting approximately 5700 results for stories based on the TV series);
FANFICTION, https://www.fanfiction.net/book/Pretty-Little-Liars-series/ (last visited June
26, 2014) (reporting 198 results for stories based on the book series); ARCHIVE OF OUR
OWN, https://archiveofourown.org/tags/Pretty%20Little%20Liars/works (last visited June
26, 2014) (reporting 370 results for the TV show); ARCHIVE OF OUR OWN,
https://archiveofourown.org/tags/Pretty%20Little%20Liars%20Series%20-%20Sara%20Shepard/
works (last visited June 26, 2014) (reporting 11 results for the book series). Some of this can
be attributed to time—Kindle Worlds hasn’t been operating for as long as the series has
been around, while FanFiction.net has been—but not all. The distinctly unpopular
Ravenswood TV series, which did launch after Kindle Worlds, yields 5 results on Kindle
Worlds, and a total of 16 on Fanfiction.net—9 Ravenswood stories, and 7 crossovers with
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more general level, a search on Fanfiction.net’s “Just In” feature117 revealed
over a hundred stories posted in the last hour. Amazon’s total for all twentyfour Worlds with content in June 2014, after over a year of availability (plus a
pre-launch period in which Amazon solicited specific authors to write), was
538.118
Kindle Worlds content is very different from the content of traditional,
unlicensed fan writing: “[w]hen you look at the Kindle Worlds bestseller list,
there’s virtually no overlap in topic, content, or source material between the
type of writing people want to pay for on Kindle Worlds, and the type of
writing that leads more than a million people to flock to [fan-run] Archive of
Our Own (AO3) each day.”119 Kindle Worlds bestsellers look a lot like other
bestsellers, with crime fiction, thrillers, and young adult supernatural fiction
as highly popular genres. By contrast, traditional fan fiction features much
more in the way of male/male romance, “short stories based around tropes
like bodyswap or time travel, and multi-chapter adventure stories with lots of
unresolved sexual tension.”120 And, unlike most fan fiction communities,
which are largely populated by women or people who don’t identify as men,
most authors of Kindle Worlds stories present themselves as men.121
One fan writer offered a useful metaphor:
After several months of operation, Amazon’s Kindle Worlds
marketplace does not show the continuous, exciting [usergenerated content] activity of a typical fanfic site. If the website
were a playground, the Kindle Worlds market would have five
quiet, clean, polite children carefully playing together while
helicopter parents hovered overhead. Meanwhile, at the
community-run fanfic site across the road, mobs of screaming
children are climbing unsupervised over the swingsets and
throwing gravel at each other. Whatever Amazon has created, there
is no life in it. Why is this?

Pretty Little Liars; crossovers as a genre are not allowed on Kindle Worlds. Ravenswood
FanFiction Archive, FanFiction, https://www.fanfiction.net/tv/Ravenswood/ (last visited June
26, 2014); Pretty Little Liars and Ravenswood Crossover, FANFICTION, https://www.fan
fiction.net/crossovers/Ravenswood/10913/ (last visited June 26, 2014).
117. Just In, FANFICTION, https://www.fanfiction.net/j/0/0/0 (last visited June 26,
2014).
118. Kindle Store › Kindle Worlds › Worlds, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/b?node=6118587011
(follow “+ See more” hyperlink under “Worlds” list in filtering options) (last visited June 26,
2014).
119. Gavia Baker-Whitelaw, Here’s Proof Amazon’s Fanfic Venture is Working, THE DAILY
DOT (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/fandom/neal-pollack-kindle-worlds-fanfic/.
120. Id.
121. See id.
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No one goes to Amazon to enjoy themselves or talk with their
friends. On a real fanfic site, there are writing contests and games,
other fans to chat with, free daily story updates from your favorite
authors, instant reviews and “likes” on your work, feedback from
“beta readers” who provide advice on how to improve your story,
discussion groups where you can trade ideas with fellow fans, a
huge free archive of previously published work to browse through,
constantly updated user blogs, group writing projects, and more.
Amazon doesn't have any of that. They just sell books.122

There is, therefore, a connection between Kindle Worlds and other
attempts to monetize “sharing” and gift economies. They fundamentally
change the nature of the relations at issue, not only by adding money but also
by adding hierarchy: someone in charge making the rules, someone who
profits not by participating but by taking a chunk of the transaction. Instead
of reciprocity—relations involving thanks, later contributions, mutual
obligation, and ties extending across time since no one interaction is ever a
complete relationship—there is an immediate “squaring up” of cash for
product.123
This is not to say that writing for money is wrong, or less valuable than
writing for free. Monetary incentives are often useful,124 and there can be
community and creativity in paid markets. There is room for dialogue on new
ways of melding creativity and commerciality. Going forward, if there is to be
compensation for some forms of fanworks, one crucial issue will be whether
creators are getting a fair share of the return for subjecting themselves to
copyright owners’ control.125
122. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF ANONYMOUS 2–3 (Nov.

13, 2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/copyrights/Anonymous.pdf.
123. Andrew Leonard, “Sharing Economy” Shams: Deception at the Core of the Internet’s Hottest
Businesses, SALON (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/14/sharing_economy_
shams_deception_at_the_core_of_the_internets_hottest_businesses/.
124. See Vohs et al., supra note 110, at 211 (noting that money “leads to a perspective on
the world that emphasizes inputs and outputs with an expectation of equity” and increases
striving for results).
125. See ZELIZER, supra note 112, at 293 (“We should stop agonizing over whether or
not money corrupts but instead analyze what combinations of economic activity and caring
relations produce happier, more just, and more productive lives. It is not the mingling that
should concern us but how the mingling works. If we get the causal connections wrong, we
will obscure the origins of injustice, damage, and danger.”). For some good discussions of
commercializing noncommercial fandom, see, e.g., Nele Noppe, Why We Should Talk about
Commodifying Fan Work, 8 TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS & CULTURES (2011),
http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/369 (emphasizing that
commercialization is worth considering only in a context in which the gift economy also
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For this Article’s purposes, however, the key point is that noncommercial
fanworks protected by fair use and commercialized fanworks are not
interchangeable, whether at the individual level or in terms of creative
communities. There are communities in which intrinsic rewards are both
important and vulnerable to crowding out by money. Both kinds of
opportunity, free and paid, should be options, especially for developing
artists who aren’t able to earn a living in the paid market and can benefit
disproportionately from other forms of reward. Noncommercial
communities encourage more creators to enter, as well as more diversity of
content, than commercial communities (where newcomers are, after all,
competitors). Licensing’s incentivizing virtues come with costs, so we should
protect diverse sources of support for creativity—including noncommercial
communities distinct from market exchanges.
3. Competition: Distorting the Market for Professional Creative Works
Kindle Worlds may also have structural effects on the market for
individual creators. This new form of licensing has the potential to drive
down the return to authors who do seek to compete in the commercial
market. Professional writers have noted that rather than being like
conventional fan fiction, Kindle Worlds is more like the established market
for authorized tie-in novels for franchises such as Star Trek, Star Wars, and
the like. But unlike tie-in authors, Kindle Worlds authors need be paid
nothing in advance.126 Hugo-winning writer John Scalzi sums up his
concerns:
I would caution anyone looking at this to be aware that overall this
is not anywhere close to what I would call a good deal. Finally, on a
philosophical level, I suspect this is yet another attempt in a series
of long-term attempts to fundamentally change the landscape for
purchasing and controlling the work of writers in such a manner
that ultimately limits how writers are compensated for their work,
which ultimately is not to the benefit of the writer.127

survives); Suzanne Scott, Repackaging Fan Culture: The Regifting Economy of Ancillary Content
Models, 3 TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS & CULTURES (2009), http://journal.
transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/150/122 (discussing the risks of
exploitation through commercial entities’ “regifting” a constrained version of fandom to the
public).
126. John Scalzi, Amazon’s Kindle Worlds: Instant Thoughts, WHATEVER (May 22, 2013),
http://whatever.scalzi.com/2013/05/22/amazons-kindle-worlds-instant-thoughts/ (noting
Kindle World’s potentially significant effects on the existing media tie-in market and
professional writers who participate in that market).
127. Id.
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The Vampire Diaries, a franchise participating in Kindle Worlds, provides a
lesson in the use of competing pieceworkers to drive down prices to the
detriment of individual creators and to the benefit of Amazon as middleman:
Alloy, the packager who owns the rights to the series, initially hired L.J.
Smith to write the books, but fired and replaced her over creative differences.
But she still loves the characters she created so much that she’s taken to
Kindle Worlds to finish the story the way she wanted, even though her
royalties are low and much of the revenue goes to the company that fired
her. An Alloy representative’s description of the affordances of Kindle
Worlds encapsulates the way in which copyright ownership is being used to
minimize the return to creative contributions: “[o]ne of the benefits of
Kindle Worlds is that any fan, even the author of the original work, can
participate.”128 In the new economy, all creators will apparently survive on
micropayments. (Of course, unpaid fan creativity can also be seen as
competing with paid writing—but, as I argued above, noncommercial works
and communities have some significant differences that deserve legal support
even as we support well-paid creativity as well.)129
Even if its compensation scheme were closer to traditional royalty
amounts, Kindle Worlds would be of concern because its exclusivity
promotes monopolization of the market for creative works.130 Amazon has a
vested interest in making content exclusive, and thus unavailable to nonusers
of its platform—the Kindle ebook reader or Kindle app.131 People who post
128. Alter, supra note 83 (emphasis added).
129. Cf. Livia Penn, Two Really Good Reasons Why Kindle Worlds is Bullshit, DREAMWIDTH
(May 23, 2013, 6:23 AM), http://liviapenn.dreamwidth.org/530961.html (“I keep seeing
people saying ‘you’ll get 20% to 35% of the profit. And that’s better than nothing!’ (Well,
sidebar: I don’t get ‘nothing’ from writing fanfic. If you’re not a fanfic writer who shares
their fic with a community of readers, it would take me another two thousand words to
explain what you *do* get, but trust me. It isn’t nothing.)”).
130. For a general discussion of the monopolizing effect of Kindle exclusivity, given
Amazon’s enormous share of the e-book market, see Parker Higgins, Accepting Amazon’s
DRM Makes It Impossible to Challenge Its Monopoly, TECHDIRT (May 28, 2014),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140527/11461627373/accepting-amazons-drm-makesit-impossible-to-challenge-its-monopoly.shtml. Kindle Worlds content also raises
preservation issues. While physical books can be preserved by archives and libraries, and
while there are major efforts to preserve large online sites that are (or have been) freely
accessible, Kindle Worlds is, like other Kindle content, legally off-limits for preservation.
Public libraries may license certain Kindle books to provide them to their patrons, but they
do not own or even deliver the licensed files from their own servers. This is also a
competition issue in the sense that libraries and archives offer alternatives to market forces
that discard everything without a sufficient present value, and allow audiences to access
works even when individual audience members cannot pay.
131. Recently, Amazon bought a specialized comics app, Comixology, that was
successful in bringing in more casual readers—something comics have struggled with for
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fan fiction online make their works available to anyone around the world
with Internet access;132 Kindle Worlds authors can only make their works
available to others within the Amazon universe, and they can’t make their
stories available for free. People who do want to read more stories about
their favorite characters, and who might otherwise have gone elsewhere and
discovered fan communities, may instead be guided into Amazon’s control.
To the extent that monopolization of delivery and publishing systems is bad
for authors in general, Amazon’s ambitions are dangerous to all authors.
III.

THERE MUST BE SOME WAY OUT OF HERE

The previous Part explained that none of these three schemes to replace
fair use are what they seem. Despite the promises of those who claim that
licensing could and should supplant fair use, current fair use doctrine remains
sound even in a pervasively digital world. The always-license model inevitably
entails pervasive suppression of expression, further threats to privacy and to
the individual and social benefits of noncommercialized communities, and
constrained competition. Fair use, in contrast, supports independence and
variety in individual works and also in the intermediaries and communities
that support them.
These examples reinforce some key lessons. First, privately negotiated
licenses can never be comprehensive.133 Licenses will inevitably leave many
creators out in the cold, especially noncommercial remixers.134 To claim that
licenses can replace fair use because some participants within each market are
willing to license most of the time is to advocate the suppression of all fair
uses that rely on works that aren’t within the licensing scheme. Getty,
Google, and Amazon are not outliers in covering only a subset of the existing
decades. Amazon quickly moved to degrade the user experience on Apple devices,
presumably to make the Kindle relatively more attractive. Gerry Conway, Gerry Conway: The
ComiXology Outrage, COMICBOOK.COM (Apr. 27, 2014), http://comicbook.com/blog/2014/
04/27/gerry-conway-the-comixology-outrage/.
132. Filtering by repressive regimes excepted, though fan fiction often escapes filters.
Fan fiction based on Western media is highly popular in China. See Liz Carter, Benedict
Cumberbatch Is a Gay Erotic God in China, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/15/erotic_benedict_cumberbatch_
fanfiction_in_china. Some bilingual speakers translate English stories for other Chinesespeaking fans, and native speakers also write their own stories, often at some personal risk
due to Chinese repression of “pornography” and homosexual content.
133. Compulsory licensing, including extended compulsory licensing for orphan works,
poses different issues.
134. OTW NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 67–69 (discussing unavailability of
licenses for many forms of content, such as art and photography, and for many specific
works even within genres in which licensing schemes allegedly exist).
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content within their respective genres. Even the extremely vague and general
promises regarding “user-generated content” in the European Union
initiative “Licences for Europe—ten pledges to bring more content
online”135 covered only a tiny fraction of the creative industries, whereas
remix cultures regularly bring in text, audio, video, and visual arts.136 “In the
music businesses, the one sector of copyrighted content headed to this model
[of identifying and licensing everything], they are far from perfecting it
despite nearly a century of good work towards it.”137 As much music as there
is, there are exponentially more written texts and images.
Second, the power to suppress retained by each of these models that are
marketed as available to everyone confirms that privately negotiated licenses
will always retain censorship rights, thus leaving creators of transformative
noncommercial works at risk of suppression.138 The works that will be
suppressed are precisely those that are the most expressive, critical, and
necessary.139 Licensors repeatedly tell prospective creators that they are
supposed to “celebrate the story the way it is”140 and “stay within the lines”
of the copyright owner’s coloring book.141 Classic defenses of fair use often
135. Licences for Europe, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 6 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/licences-for-europe/131113_ten-pledges_
en.pdf.
136. DEVIANTART NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 35, at 6–7.
137. Id. at 31.
138. True blanket licensing generally requires either legislative intervention (the statutory
license for mechanical works) or judicial intervention (the antitrust consent decrees that
shape ASCAP and BMI licensing).
139. OTW NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 69–71; see also, e.g., MARK DUFFETT,
UNDERSTANDING FANDOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF MEDIA FAN CULTURE
176 (2013) (“Elvis Presley Enterprises offers another example of a media organization that
has incorporated and licensed fan creativity on one hand—adding fan art at Graceland and
turning fan artist Betty Harper’s sketches into postcards—and simultaneously attempted to scotch
or rein in fan expressions when they ran counter to its financial interest.”) (citing TIM WALL,
STUDYING POPULAR MUSIC CULTURE 205–10 (2003)); Julie Levin Russo, User-Penetrated
Content: Fan Video in the Age of Convergence, 48 CINEMA J. 125 (2009) (discussing earlier
experiments with domesticating fanworks, including fanworks for Battlestar Galactica).
140. Simone Murray, “Celebrating the Story the Way It Is”: Cultural Studies, Corporate Media,
and the Contested Utility of Fandom, 18 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUDIES 7 (2004).
141. The Amazing Fan-Powered Media Event, FANLIB 3, http://fanlore.org/w/images/4/
42/FanLib_info.pdf (from marketing material for a for-profit, licensed-material-only site
released in 2003) (accessed June 19, 2014):
MANAGED & MODERATED TO THE MAX
All the FANLIB action takes place in a highly customized environment
that YOU control.
As with a coloring book, players must “stay within the lines”
Restrictive player’s terms-of-service protects your rights and property
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focus on the individual uses that are banned by copyright owners. Although
those uses may constitute a shrinking percentage of remixes in a licenseeverything world (bans on portraying a G.I. Joe character as a Yankees fan
notwithstanding) simply because digital technologies have massively
increased the total number of remixes, the impact of the most critical uses
can be outsized. Thus, it’s still important to support transgressive reworkings,
such as Alice Randall’s rewriting of Gone with the Wind to address the racism
and sexual politics of the original.142
Third, creators benefit from the ability to escape pervasive data collection
and excessively sanitized content platforms. People produce different kinds
of works when they believe themselves to be under scrutiny.143 A journal kept
in school so that the teacher can read it will differ in content from letters to
friends. A Kindle Worlds novella, for which the author can only be paid by
handing over her real name and contact information to Amazon, or a post
whose content hinges on a Getty embed, will be crafted with awareness of
the controlling party, at least in the back of the creator’s mind. Fair use
enables creators to set themselves free of copyright owners’ surveillance.
Fourth, fair use protects competition compared to a licensing-only world.
A more standard competition story in copyright is about devices: fair use
enabled Sony to escape liability as the manufacturer of the VCR, a device
with substantial noninfringing uses. (It’s worth noting that one of the
alternatives to fair use suggested by Sony’s opponents was some sort of
blanket licensing scheme.)144 The VCR then proved a huge economic boon
to the movie industry, even as Sony’s Betamax technology fell to the more
flexible VHS. Freedom spurred innovation as competitors fought in the
marketplace. By contrast, devices that existing content industries controlled
have usually been so weighted down with anti-consumer features that they
fail. When was the last time you used a digital recorder subject to the Audio
Home Recording Act and its mandatory royalty scheme?145
Moderated “scene missions” keep the story under your control
Full monitoring & management of submissions & players
Automatic “profanity filter”
Completed work is just 1st draft to be polished by the pros.
142. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
143. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425 (2000); Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH.
222, 316–34 (2005); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 493–94
(2006).
144. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir.
1981).
145. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012).
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Fair use has other competition-protecting features as well. Licensing
protects monopolies by creating higher barriers to entry than fair use. For
example, when Google was sued for scanning hundreds of thousands of
library books, it initially supported a settlement that required it to pay
licensing fees, but that was rational for many reasons, including the fact that
it created significant barriers to entry for potential competitors.146 By
contrast, the finding that scanning in order to create snippets and analyze the
books for content was fair use allows other entities to do the same thing,147
even though most probably won’t have Google’s resources.
Finally, these new initiatives to control all uses have made more salient
the fact that monopolies aren’t just bad for welfare in general; they’re bad for
creators. When we defend fair use, it is also necessary to consider
communities of practice, from which many fair uses arise.148 Shakespeare
emerged from a vibrant community of playwrights and actors. Most likely, so
will his next successor. Widespread, freewheeling environments in which
everything is up for reuse and transformation are what enable the best
creators to learn and succeed. If only the most transgressive and unpopular
themes can escape licensing, then even if they successfully do so, their
creators will be isolated from the interactions and incentives that a larger
community of transformative users can offer.
Alternative, unlicensed forms of infrastructure, not just individual works,
are important for creative freedom. A blogger on WordPress can format and
transform images she uploads any way she likes, and can swap tips and tricks
with others like her to improve her work—unless Getty embeds take over.
Specialized video sites with subcultural or niche appeal can use the DMCA to
protect against copyright liability and allow the development of fair use and
other norms—unless Content ID screening becomes a requirement.149 As
Francesca Coppa, one of the founders of the nonprofit Organization for
Transformative Works, says:

146. Ariel Katz, Fair Use for the Google Goose; Fair Use for the Book Gander, ARIEL KATZ
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://arielkatz.org/archives/2992/.
147. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
148. See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2011); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to
Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
149. See IN MEDIAS RES, http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/imr/ (curated
scholarly collection of significant multimedia works, including video); cf. Darnell Witt, Staff
Blog: Copyright Match on Vimeo, VIMEO (May 21, 2014), https://vimeo.com/blog/post:626/
(discussing video site Vimeo’s recent decision to go beyond the DMCA and filter audio
content, with an appeals system for mistaken decisions whose contours are as yet
undefined).
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Today, when I talk about the importance of fan writing, I don’t just
mean fiction and nonfiction: I mean contracts and code. In the old
days, fans self-published their fiction . . . , they distributed their
own VHS cassettes and digital downloads, and they coded and built
their own websites and created their own terms of service. Today,
enormous commercial entities—YouTube, Amazon, LiveJournal,
Wattpad, Tumblr—own much of this infrastructure.150

As Coppa points out, none of these new services
has anything like the track record of the average fandom or fannish
institution; consider how much younger they are than Sherlock
Holmes, Doctor Who, or even Supernatural fandom [which began
in 2004]. In the best case, these companies may fail and become a
disruptive force in relatively stable and long-term communities; in
the worst case, they may exploit and betray their users.151

The Internet is littered with the corpses of business models that were
supposed to last a very long time—including models specifically designed to
exploit noncommercial creativity.152
When a gold rush ends, the result is stripped hills and ghost towns, not
communities and thriving ecosystems. The new licensing gold rush risks the
same consequences if we don’t defend permissionless alternatives to
licensing. Current doctrine correctly recognizes that copyright owners’
willingness to license, control, or monetize a use does not mean that the use
is unfair if unauthorized. Indeed, even countries that don’t have a fair use
defense have increasingly recognized the merits of protecting certain
unauthorized uses. In the United Kingdom, for example, the government
proposed to change copyright law to make clear that the availability of a
license isn’t an absolute bar to certain unauthorized uses. Other factors are
also relevant to whether a use constitutes a permissible fair dealing: “the
terms on which the licence is available, including the ease with which it may
be obtained, the value of the permitted acts to society as a whole, and the

150. Francesca Coppa, Participations: Dialogues on the Participatory Promise of Contemporary
Culture and Politics, 8 INT’L J. COMM. 1069, 1072 (2014).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., FANLIB, http://fanlore.org/wiki/FanLib/ (last visited May 14, 2014)
(recounting the launch, and subsequent disappearance, of a venture capital-funded initiative
designed to commercialize fan fiction on behalf of content owners and allow fan authors to
win content owner-run sweepstakes). Lucasfilms once offered Star Wars fans free web space
on starwars.com, as well as “unique” authorized content for their sites, but only under the
condition that whatever they created would be owned by the studio. See HENRY JENKINS,
CONVERGENCE CULTURE 152, 156–57 (2006). Today, starwars.com still exists, but the free
web space for fans is gone.
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likelihood and extent of any harm to right holders.”153 Thus, the government
rejected the argument that the “mere availability of a licence should
automatically require licensing a permitted act.”154
Despite copyright owners’ claims that this time is different, we’ve seen
this show before. Markets are transforming, as they regularly do. But fair use
shouldn’t contract in response.

153. Modernising Copyright: A Modern, Robust and Flexible Framework, U.K. GOVERNMENT
13 (2012), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/response-2011-copyright-final.pdf.
154. Id.
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